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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the macroeconomic consequences of preferences displaying  a subsistence point.
It departs from the existing related literature by assuming that subsistence points are specific to each
variety of goods rather than to the composite consumption good. We show that this simple feature
makes the price elasticity of demand for individual goods procyclical. As a result, markups behave


















There is a long literature in microeconomics, going back to the seminal work of Stone (1950)
and Geary (1954), studying the role of non-homothetic preferences for the speciﬁcation of
demand functions. The existence of subsistence points also has macroeconomic implica-
tions. In particular, subsistence points aﬀect the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of consumption and therefore aggregate savings. For this reason, in macroeconomic theory
Stone-Geary preferences have been studied mostly for understanding the process of economic
development and transitional dynamics (for recent studies, see Matsuyama 2002; and Ste-
ger, 2000). Comparatively little work has been devoted to exploring the consequences of
Stone-Geary preferences for business-cycle ﬂuctuations.
The contribution of this paper is to show that Stone-Geary preferences can have im-
portant consequences for the propagation of aggregate shocks. The novel element of our
analysis is to introduce subsistence points at the level of individual varieties of goods, as
opposed to at the level of aggregate consumption goods. We embed the assumption of good-
speciﬁc subsistence points into an economy with imperfectly competitive product markets
a la Dixit-Stiglitz.1 Modeling subsistence points in consumption of individual goods vari-
eties implies that the demand for individual varieties features a time-varying price elasticity.
Speciﬁcally, the price elasticity of demand is procyclical. We assume that goods are supplied
by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms. In setting prices, producers of individual varieties
take into account the procyclicality of the price-elasticity of demand and as a result charge
countercyclical markups.
The intuition behind the countercyclicality of markups in a model with good-speciﬁc sub-
sistence points is straightforward. Under the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation assumption,
the demand for individual varieties is of the form qit = p
−η
it qt, where qit denotes the demand
for good i, pit denotes the (relative) price of good i, and qt is a measure of aggregate de-
mand. This formulation of demand obtains either in the absence of subsistence points or
when subsistence points are modeled at the level of aggregate consumption. The above de-
mand function features a constant price elasticity equal to η. As a result, monopolistically
competitive producers charge a constant markup of prices over marginal costs. When subsis-





i denotes the subsistence level of consumption of good i, and q∗ is a constant. This
demand function is the sum of an isoelastic term, p
−η
it (qt − q∗), with price elasticity η,a n da
1Atkeson and Ogaki (1996) also allow for goods speciﬁc subsistence points but concentrate on the impli-
cations of this assumption for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In particular, these authors do
not consider the supply-side ramiﬁcations of good-speciﬁc subsistence points, which are at the center of our
analysis.
1price inelastic term, q∗
i. Thus, the price elasticity of demand is a weighted average of η and
0. The weight on the price-elastic term is determined by the importance of the price-elastic
component of demand in total demand. It follows that an expansion in aggregate demand
(i.e., an increase in qt), is associated with a rise in the price elasticity of demand. Because
markups are inversely related to the price elasticity, implies that Stone-Geary preferences at
the level of individual goods give rise to a theory of countercyclical markups. The counter-
cyclical behavior of markups is in line with the available empirical evidence. For a survey of
this evidence, see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999.
Countercyclical markups are potentially important for understanding the propagation
of aggregate shocks. In particular, countercyclical movements in markups have important
consequences for the way in which the economy is aﬀected by aggregate demand shocks. To
see this, note that the reciprocal of the markup acts as a shifter of the aggregate labor demand
schedule. Hence, models with countercyclical markups have the potential to account for the
empirical facts that wages and consumption rise in response to positive demand shocks. In
this respect, the model with good-speciﬁc Stone-Geary preferences brings data and theory a
step closer.
One may question the relevance of studying the role of subsistence points for the prop-
agation of business cycles in developed countries on the grounds that as an economy grows,
the relative importance of subsistence absorption in aggregate demand may be expected to
vanish. This view is correct if subsistence points are understood in a narrow sense. That
is, as referring to the minimum amount of food, clothing, and shelter necessary to sustain
life. However, a broader interpretation of necessities would include those dictated by social
norms. A luxury in a poor society, such as tab water, inside plumbing, and health care are
considered necessities in developed countries. Thus, it is conceivable that subsistence points
might be appropriately modeled as an increasing function of long-run measures of output. In
this case, non-homotheticities in preferences may remain relevant for understanding business
cycle ﬂuctuations even for economies traveling along a stable development path.
The remainder of the paper is organized in 3 sections. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 discusses the business-cycle implications of the model. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The basic structure of the model is the standard real-business-cycle model augmented with a
monopolistically competitive structure of product markets a la Dixit-Stiglitz. The innovation
of the model is to assume the existence of subsistence consumption at the level of individual
varieties as opposed to at the level of the composite good and the combination of this aspect
2with monopolitic competition.
2.1 Households
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of identical households with preferences







t − vt,h t), (1)
where xc
t denotes consumption of a composite good, ht denotes labor eﬀort, and vt denotes
an exogenous and stochastic preference shock following a univariate autoregressive process
of the form
vt = ρvvt−1 + ￿
v
t,
with ρv ∈ [0,1) and ￿v
t distributed i.i.d. with mean zero and standard deviation σv. This
shock is meant to capture innovations to the level of private non-business absorption.
The composite consumption good xc
t is composed of a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods
indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Speciﬁcally, xc













i denotes the subsistence level of consumption of good i. The demands for individual
varieties are the solution to the dual problem of minimizing consumption expenditure, given
by
R 1
0 Pitcitdi, where Pit denotes the nominal price of good i, subject to the aggregation
constraint (2) given xc


















, is a nominal price index. The presence of a good-speciﬁc
subsistence point alters the demand function implied by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator in a
fundamental way. For in the presence of good-speciﬁc subsistence points, the price elasticity
of demand is no longer constant. Now the demand function is the sum of an isoelastic term,
(Pit/Pt)−ηxc
t, and a price inelastic term, c∗
i. The price elasticity of demand is therefore a
weighted average of the elasticity of the isoelastic term, η, and the elasticity of the inelastic
term, 0. Thus, the price elasticity of demand is no larger than η. This implies that the pres-
ence of good-speciﬁc subsistence points increases the market power of the monopolistically
3competitive producers of good i. More importantly, the price elasticity of demand is time
varying and increasing in aggregate demand. This is because the weight on the isoelastic
component increases with xc
t, which is a measure of aggregate demand. In other words, in
expansions subsistence points aﬀect aggregate demand relatively less than in recessions. The
procyclicality of the price elasticity of demand is the basic element driving the result that in
equilibrium markups are countercyclical.
Households are assumed to own physical capital. The capital stock held by the household,
denoted kt, is assumed to evolve over time according to the following law of motion




t denotes investment in period t. Investment is a composite good produced using a












Here, i∗ > 0 denotes a minimum level of good-speciﬁc investment required to produce new
capital goods. We introduce this feature to maintain symmetry across the various com-
ponents of aggregate absorption. In this way, we isolate the eﬀects of good speciﬁc price-
inelastic demands on the dynamic behavior of markups. Assuming alternatively that i∗ =0
implies that shocks to the economy not only changes the price elasticity of consumption
demand but also the weight of the components of aggregate demand that are subject to
time-varying price elasticity. Here we choose to focus of the former of these eﬀects, ie.
i∗ > 0.
For any given levels of xi
t, purchases of each variety i ∈ [0,1] in period t must solve
the dual problems of minimizing total investment expenditure,
R 1
0 Pitiitdi, subject to the











At the optimum, we have that Ptxi
t =
R 1
0 Pit(iit − i∗
i)di.
At the beginning of each period t ≥ 0, households rent their stock of capital to ﬁrms at
the rate ut. Households are assumed to have access to complete contingent claims markets.
Let rt,t+j denote the stochastic discount factor such that Etrt,t+jzt+j is the period-t price of
a random payment zt+j in period t + j. In addition, households are assumed to be entitled
to the receipt of pure proﬁts from the ownership of ﬁrms, Φt. Then, the representative










i)di. The variable wt denotes the real wage rate. In addition,
households are assumed to be subject to a borrowing constraint that prevents them from
engaging in Ponzi games. The household’s problem can then be stated as consisting of
choosing processes xc
t, ht, xi
t, dt+1, and kt, so as to maximize the lifetime utility function (1)
subject to (4), (7), and a borrowing constraint that prevents it from engaging in Ponzi-type
schemes, given processes vt, ωt, wt, rt,t+1, ut, and Φt. The optimality conditions associated
with this problem are (4), (7), a transversality condition, and
−
Uh(xc
t − vt,h t)
Ux(xc




t − vt,h t)=βEtUx(x
c
t+1 − vt+1,h t+1)[1 − δ + ut+1]
Ux(x
c
t − vt,h t)rt,t+1 = βUx(x
c
t+1 − vt+1,h t+1)
The above 3 optimality conditions are identical to those arising from the standard neoclassical
model. Note, however, that the presence of subsistence points also aﬀects the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption as well as the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
between consumption and leisure. These eﬀects are the same in our model as in models that
assume subsistence points at the level of aggregate consumption.
2.2 The Government
Each period t ≥ 0, nominal government spending is given by Ptgt. We assume that real
government expenditures, denoted by gt, are exogenous, stochastic, and follow a univariate
ﬁrst-order autoregressive process of the form
ln(gt/¯ g)=ρg ln(gt−1/¯ g)+￿
g
t,
where the innovation ￿
g
t is assumed to be distributed as an i.i.d. process with mean zero
and standard deviation σg. The government allocates spending over individual varieties of
goods, git, so as to maximize the quantity of a composite good produced with diﬀerentiated













i denote good-speciﬁc levels of subsistence consumption of public goods. As
in the case of investment demand, good-speciﬁc subsistence levels of government consumption
is introduce to preserve symmetry in the speciﬁcation of aggregate demand. Later, we will
also consider the case g∗
i = 0 for all i. The government’s problem consists in choosing git,
i ∈ [0,1], so as to maximize x
g
t subject to the budget constraint
R 1
0 Pitgit ≤ Ptgt. The






















Public spending is assumed to be fully ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation.
2.3 Firms
Each good i ∈ [0,1] is manufactured by a monopolist using labor and capital as inputs via
the following production technology:
yit = AtF(kit,h it) − φ, (9)
where yit denotes output of good i, kit and hit denote services of capital and labor, and φ
denotes ﬁxed costs of production. While we assume that F is homogeneous of degree one, the
presence of ﬁxed costs introduces increasing returns to scale in the production technology.
We include ﬁxed costs to ensure that proﬁts are relatively small on average as is the case for
the U.S. economy in spite of equilibrium markups of price over marginal cost signiﬁcantly
above zero. The variable At denotes an aggregate technology shock. We assume that the
logarithm of At follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process




t is a white noise disturbance with standard deviation σa.
Firms are price setters. In exchange, they must stand ready to satisfy demand at the
announced prices. Formally, ﬁrm i must satisfy
AtF(kit,h it) − φ ≥ cit + iit + git, (11)
where cit, iit, and git are given by equations (3), (6), and (8), respectively.
6Firm i’s problem consists of choosing processes pit ≡ Pit/Pt, cit, git, iit, hit, and kit, so as




r0,t [pit(cit + iit + git) − wthit − utkit], (12)














i, and mcit denote the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (11),

















The ﬁrst two of these optimality conditions simply state that the marginal cost of producing
good i equals the factor price divided by its marginal product.
The third optimality condition contains the essence for why the model with good-speciﬁc
subsistence points provides a theory of countercyclical markups. It relates the markup of
prices over marginal costs, pit/mcit, to the price elasticity of demand, η(1 − x∗
i/yit). In the
absence of subsistence points, x∗
i = 0, the price elasticity of demand is constant and equal
to η. As a result, in this case the markup is also time invariant and equal to η/(η − 1). In
the economy with subsistence points, x∗
i > 0, the price elasticity is increasing in sales, yit,
and therefore the markup is decreasing in this variable.2
2.4 Symmetric Equilibrium
For simplicity we assume that the level of subsistence of each component of absorption is
invariant across varieties. That is, c∗
i = c∗, g∗
i = g∗, and i∗
i = i∗, for all varieties i ∈ [0,1]. As
in much of the related literature, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria in which all
ﬁrms charge the same price. It follows that in equilibrium the relative price of each variety,
pit, equals unity. It also follows that we can drop the subscript i from all variables. Moreover,
in equilibrium xc
t = ct−c∗, xi
t = it−i∗, and x
g
t = gt−g∗. A stationary symmetric equilibrium
is then given by stationary stochastic processes kt+1, ht, wt, ut, yt, ct, it, and µt satisfying
equations (13)-(19) given in the appendix, given the stochastic processes describing vt, At,
2Had we assumed the absence of subsistence points in investment or in government spending, the com-
position of aggregate demand would enter this expression.
7gt, and the initial condition k0.
3 The Cyclical Behavior of Markups
From the optimality conditions of the ﬁrm, it is straightforward to see that the equilibrium








Clearly, because the subsistence level of absorption, x∗, is necessarily less than total ab-
sorption, yt, it follows immediately that for a given value of η, the equilibrium markup is
larger than the markup that would obtain in the absence of subsistence absorption, given by
η/(η−1).3 Furthermore, it is clear that, given x∗, the larger is the level of aggregate activity,
yt, the smaller is the markup. In other words, the markup is countercyclical. Intuitively, this
eﬀect is brought about by the fact that an increase in aggregate demand makes subsistence
points less important and therefore increases the price elasticity faced by producers. The
issue is then how important this eﬀect is. Letting ￿
µ
t denote the elasticity of the equilibrium





(1 − x∗/yt)[η(1 − x∗/yt) − 1]
< 0.
Under the maintained assumption that the price elasticity of demand exceeds unity, the
output elasticity of the markup is negative. Table 1 illustrates how the size of the markup
and the elasticity of the markup change as the share of subsistence absorption in total output
increases from 0 to 0.8. In the table we assume that η takes a value of 6. The table shows
that for low values of the markup the income elasticity of the markup is quite small. For
example, in the extreme case when subsistence demand accounts for 50 percent of total
absorption, the equilibrium markup is 50 percent, a high value given the available empirical
evidence. Nevertheless, the output elasticity of the markup is only 0.5, which means that
a 1 percent increase in output lowers the markup by less than 1 percentage point, from 50
to 49.25 percent. Thus, it appears that although this model has the potential of generating
countercyclical markups, the elasticity of the markup to output is moderate for realistic
values of the steady-state markup.
3For the individual ﬁrm’s problem to be well deﬁned, it must be the case that the price elasticity is
greater than one, that is, it must be the case that η(1 − x∗/yt) > 1. In what follows we will assume that
this condition is satisﬁed.














Note: x∗ denotes subsistence absorption, yt denotes aggregate demand, µt denotes
the gross markup, and ￿
µ
t denotes the elasticity of the markup with respect to
aggregate demand. The parameter η is assumed to be 6.
Figure 1 displays impulse responses to preference, government spending, and productivity
shocks. The calibration of the model follows Ravn, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe (2004). We
set the share of subsistence absorption in total absorption to 30 percent (x∗/y =0 .3). In
this case the average markup equals 37 percent. Table 2 displays the values assigned to the
remaining deep structural parameters of the benchmark economy. This economy is shown
with solid lines in the ﬁgure. For comparison, we include with broken lines, the response of
an economy without subsistence absorption (x∗/y = 0).
The model economy without subsistence absorption exhibits no movements in markups.
We note that in an economy with subsistence points at the level of aggregate absorption
(as opposed to at the level of each variety of goods) markups are also constant along the
business cycle. This is because in this case the demand functions faced by the monopolistic
producers of each variety are price isoelastic.
By contrast, in the economy with good-speciﬁc subsistence points the markup responds
countercyclically to all 3 shocks. However, quantitatively the predicted markup movements
are small. In particular, the decline in markups in response to demand shocks is not strong
enough to overturn the negative response of wages. The reason why wages decline less in the
model with good-speciﬁc subsistence points than in the model without this feature is that
changes in the markup aﬀect the aggregate labor demand curve. Speciﬁcally, the demand
for labor takes the form wt = AtFh(kt,h t)/µt. So a decline in the markup shifts the demand
schedule out. Thus, when the markup is countercyclical its eﬀect on the demand for labor














































































Subsistence Point Model (x∗/y =0 .3) No Subsistence Point (x∗/y =0 )
Row 1: Preference Shock. Row 2: Government Spending Shock. Row 3: Tech-
nology shock. Impulse responses are measured in percent deviations from steady
state. Horizontal axes display the number of quarters after the shock.
10Table 2: Calibration
Symbol Value Description
β 0.9902 Subjective discount factor
σ 2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
c∗ 0.064 subsistence level of consumption
g∗ 0.011 subsistence level of public consumption
i∗ 0.016 subsistence level of investment
α 0.25 capital elasticity of output
δ 0.01 Quarterly depreciation rate
η 5.3 Elasticity of substitution across varieties
￿hw 1.3 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
h 0.2 Steady-State fraction of time devoted to work
¯ g 0.0367 Steady-state level of government purchases
φ 0.1129 Fixed cost
ρv,ρ g,ρ a 0.9 Persistence of exogenous shocks
is similar to the eﬀect of positive productivity shocks. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992)
show that in U.S. postwar data wages increase in response to demand shocks in the form of
innovations in public consumption. They use this feature of the data to judge the empirical
plausibility of various models of the business cycle.
In the model without good-speciﬁc subsistence points, an increase in government pur-
chases is associated with a decline in private consumption. This eﬀect is a consequence of
a negative wealth eﬀect caused by the increase in unproductive government spending. In
the economy with good-speciﬁc subsistence points, consumption also falls in response to the
increase in public absorption, but by less than in the economy with homothetic preferences.
The reason is that in the economy with good-speciﬁc absorption the decline in markups
leads to a smaller fall in wages which causes a substitution eﬀect toward consumption and
away from leisure. This substitution eﬀect is not suﬃciently strong to oﬀset the negative
wealth eﬀect. As a result, consumption falls. This prediction of the model brings theory
and data a step closer. For available evidence suggests that positive government purchases
shocks are associated with expansions in private consumption (see, e.g., Gal´ ı et al., 2003;
and Blanchard and Perotti, 2002).
4 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that the simple introduction of subsistence points at the level of
individual goods in the context of an otherwise quite standard dynamic general equilibrium
11model gives rise to a theory countercyclical markups. The resulting theory contributes to
understanding two important aspects of the data, namely, the cyclical behavior of real wages
and private consumption in response to government spending shocks. In eﬀect, the standard
neoclassical model implies a strong negative correlation between wages and aggregate spend-
ing, originating in negative wealth eﬀects associated with unproductive public spending. The
countercyclicality of markups induces expansions in the demand for labor during booms and
the reverse during contractions, thereby reducing the tendency for wages and government
spending to move in opposite directions.
While the model with Stone-Geary preferences at the level of individual varieties repre-
sents a step in the right direction, it leaves much ground to be covered. In particular, like
other theories of endogenous markups, the good-speciﬁc subsistence point model faces a steep
tradeoﬀ between the level of the markup and the elasticity of the markup with respect to
output. The higher the markup, the higher the output elasticity of the markup. For realistic
markup levels the subsistence point model implies a relatively small elasticity, which limits
the model’s ability to explain the observed wage and consumption dynamics in response to
demand shocks. Alleviating the level-elasticity tradeoﬀ of markups is an important challenge
for future research.
12Appendix
Stationary Competitive Equilibrium: A stationary symmetric equilibrium is a set of
stationary stochastic processes kt+1, ht, wt, ut, yt, ct, it, and µt satisfying
−
Uh(ct − c∗ − vt,h t)
Ux(ct − c∗ − vt,h t)
= wt (13)
Ux(ct − c
∗ − vt,h t)=βEtUx(ct+1 − c
∗ − vt+1,h t+1)[1 − δ + ut+1] (14)
AtF(kt,h t) − φ = ct + it + gt (15)















yt = ct + gt + it (19)
given stochastic processes vt, At, gt, and the initial condition k0.
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